On 28 June 2006, Paragon and Riccelli Enterprises entered into a lease agreement for eleven semi-trailers. As part of the agreement, Riccelli Enterprises agreed to pay monthly on-time rent of $US 1,000 for some semi-trailers and $1,100 per month for others. The agreement required Riccelli Enterprises to maintain and repair the tank trailers and return them to a certain condition or to bear the consequences. The lease entered into by Riccelli Enterprises was also personally guaranteed by Mr. Riccelli. In a letter attached to the application for summary judgment, the applicant asserted that the defendant owed the applicant an amount of $125,143.11 under the lease agreement. Following the discovery, Traub Lieberman requested a summary judgment against the tenant for his cross-right to compensation and drew attention to the compensation and insurance rules contained in the driver in the commercial lease agreement. In contrast, the tenant argued that the New York General Obligations Law ยง7-321 rendered the indemnification provision in the lease unenforceable because it would compensate the landlord for his own negligence. Referring to the public authority, which concerned, inter alia, cases in which the lessee had suffered damage as a result of the lessor`s negligence, the lessee also argued that the use of the insurance collection provision to enforce the compensation provision thwarted Articles 7 to 321. However, the Tribunal cannot automatically render a summary judgment in favour of Paragon simply because the defendants did not effectively oppose the application.

A court may render a summary judgment without opposition only if, after interpreting all the essential facts in favour of the move, it finds that a summary judgment is legally appropriate. Wienco, Inc. v. Katahn Assocs., 965 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1992); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (e) (2). After interpreting all the facts relevant to the case, the Tribunal finds that it can reasonably make a partial summary judgment on the language of the contract. Paragon itself presents the language of the rental agreement to support its request for plain language. The court does not spy on any obvious ambiguity and the facts presented do not suggest a latent ambiguity. Furthermore, the respondents do not invoke any ambiguity in their response to the request for summary judgment or in their response to the complaint. Instead, the defendant`s response states that the terms of the lease “speak for themselves.” Accordingly, the Tribunal will grant Paragon`s application for a partial summary judgment and declare the lease unequivocal. The applicant`s request for a summary judgment was made at the hearing on 25 June 1990.

On the same day, the accused filed an amendment to his response, in which he submitted two additional filings. It was asserted that the defendant had signed the lease in a representative capacity and that the lease needed to be reformed to reflect that “Santa Fe Capital Corporation” was the “true lessee”. It was also asserted that the applicant`s appeal was precluded “by the doctrine of estoppel, legal force and estoppel by judgment”. The issue in court is neither involved nor complex. Indeed, the argument put forward by both parties in the request letter, the reply letter and the reply letter covers only six pages in total. The defendants further facilitate the court`s task by not directly opposing the paragon`s request. Paragon requests that the language of the rental agreement be clear. The defendants do not argue that the language of the contract is ambiguous.

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